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Abstract 
Using ownership and control data for 890 firm-years, this paper examines the concentration 
of capital and voting rights in British companies in the second half of the nineteenth century.  
We find that both capital and voting rights were diffuse by modern-day standards.  This 
implies that ownership was separated from control in the UK much earlier than previously 
thought, and given that it occurred in an era with weak shareholder protection law, it 
undermines the influential law and finance hypothesis.  We also find that diffuse ownership is 
correlated with large boards, a London head office, non-linear voting rights, and shares traded 
on multiple markets. 
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1. Introduction 
In the Victorian era, the public company in the UK came of age following the liberalisation 
of incorporation law, which culminated in the Companies Act of 1862.  We know that this 
coming of age was accompanied by an expansion of the equity market and an increased 
democratisation of share ownership.1  To date, however, the structure of corporate ownership 
and the degree to which ownership was separated from control in Victorian public companies 
has largely been a statistical dark hole.  Using detailed corporate ownership records which 
were collected annually by the Registrar of Companies from 1856, this paper is the first to 
provide quantitative and systematic evidence on the structure of corporate ownership of 
publicly-traded companies in Victorian Britain. The main findings, based on our sample of 
890 firm years, are that ownership, both in terms of capital and voting rights, was diffuse and 
that there was a divorce of ownership from control in Victorian Britain.  Our analysis of the 
potential determinants of ownership structure suggest that diffuse ownership is correlated 
with large boards, having a London head office, restrictions on the voting rights of large 
shareholders, and shares being traded on multiple regional stock markets.     
A study of ownership structure in Victorian Britain is important because there is some 
debate as to when dispersed ownership emerged in the UK.  Berle and Means in their seminal 
study established that a separation of ownership and control had occurred in large American 
corporations before the 1920s.2  Until recently, the majority of the extant literature has 
                                                          
1
 Grossman, ‘New indices’; Rutterford et al., ‘Who comprised the nation’. 
2
 Berle and Means, Modern Corporation.  Although there have been recent challenges to this view, the Berle 
and Means characterisation of corporate ownership in the US remains the orthodox view amongst economists 
and historians.  See Cheffins and Bank, ‘Myth’; Hannah, ‘Divorce of ownership’; Holderness, ‘Myth of diffuse 
ownership’; Lipartito and Morii, ‘Rethinking the separation’. 
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suggested that dispersed ownership appeared in Britain much later than this.3  However, 
Hannah has argued that diffuse ownership was commonplace by 1900, and Foreman-Peck 
and Hannah show that ownership was divorced from control for the largest British companies 
in 1911.4 Our study complements and augments Foreman-Peck and Hannah in several ways.  
First, whereas Foreman-Peck and Hannah’s analysis is based solely on director share 
ownership, our study is based on comprehensive ownership data for each company, which 
enables us to develop Herfindahl measures of ownership concentration as well as identify 
large owners who may not necessarily have been on the board of directors.  Second, we find 
that dispersed ownership is commonplace at least half a century earlier than 1911.  Third, we 
find that ownership is dispersed in medium-sized and small companies, and not just in the 
largest.  Fourth, by analysing ownership structure over half a century, we are able to pick up 
trends.  For example, we find that companies established in the 1890s had more concentrated 
ownership than companies established in earlier periods.  This finding is consistent with 
Cheffins et al. and Franks et al. who find that companies established around 1900 tended to 
have concentrated ownership.5 
This study is significant for at least a further two reasons.  First, several business and 
economic historians have suggested that Britain’s twentieth-century economic decline and 
managerial failure has some of its roots in the concentrated structure of corporate ownership 
                                                          
3
 Florence, Ownership; Nyman and Silberston, ‘Ownership’; Scott, ‘Corporate control’; Leech and Leahy, 
‘Ownership structure’; Cheffins, ‘Does law matter’, Corporate Ownership; Coffee, ‘Rise’; Roe, ‘Political 
preconditions’; Franks et al., ‘Ownership’. 
4
 Hannah, ‘Divorce of ownership’; Foreman-Peck and Hannah, ‘Extreme divorce’.  Braggion and Moore, 
‘Dividend policies’ also find that ownership was separated from control for a small sample of companies at the 
turn of the twentieth century. 
5
 Cheffins et al., ‘Ownership dispersion’; Franks et al., ‘Ownership’. 
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which emerged out of the nineteenth century.6  Second, if corporate ownership is path 
dependant, as some scholars believe, it is important that we know the structure of ownership 
in the UK at the origin of the modern public company.7 
Our paper contributes to the debate regarding the preconditions for the emergence of 
the diffusely-owned corporation.  The influential law and finance school argue that strong 
legal protection of minority shareholders is a precondition of dispersed ownership.8  As 
Britain had a laissez-faire corporate law regime from the perspective of most minority 
shareholders in non-statutory companies in the nineteenth century, our finding that corporate 
ownership is dispersed is evidence against the law and finance hypothesis.9  Coffee, on the 
other hand, argues that dispersed ownership arose not because of specific legal rules per se, 
but because of the emergence of a decentralized and pluralistic political regime, which 
resulted in a private sector relatively free from government interference and which permitted 
entrepreneurs to use private contracts to make credible commitments to small shareholders.  
As Britain had a pluralistic political regime by the second half of the nineteenth century, 
having abandoned patronage-based politics and enfranchised all property owners in the first 
half of the century, our discovery of many companies with dispersed ownership is consistent 
with Coffee’s hypothesis.   
Our findings on the preconditions for diffuse ownership concur with recent studies on 
corporate ownership in other economies.  For example, Hilt finds that ownership was 
separated from control in early nineteenth-century U.S. corporations despite corporate law 
                                                          
6
 Chandler, Scale and Scope; Elbaum and Lazonick, ‘Decline’. 
7
 Bebchuk and Roe, ‘Theory of path dependence’. 
8
 La Porta et al. ‘Law and finance’, ‘Corporate ownership’.  See Musacchio, ‘Law and finance’ for an historical 
counterexample to the law and finance hypothesis. 
9
 See Campbell and Turner, ‘Substitutes’.   
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offering little in the way of shareholder protection.10  Musacchio finds that ownership 
concentration in pre-1910 Brazil was relatively low, but became more concentrated in the 
twentieth century contemporaneously with an improvement in shareholder protection.11  
Similarly, Franks et al. find that corporate ownership in Japan in the first half of the twentieth 
century was relatively dispersed and that the increase in the concentration of ownership 
coincided with a significant enhancement of shareholder protection law.12   
 The next section of this paper examines the preconditions for the rise of diffuse 
ownership and the separation of ownership from control.  Section three describes the gradual 
liberalisation of incorporation law in the UK and examines the ownership structure of several 
pre-1855 companies for which ownership data exists.  Section four describes our ownership 
and control data sources.  Section five presents our main findings on the structure of 
ownership in Victorian Britain.  Section six analyses the determinants of ownership structure. 
      
2. The preconditions for diffuse ownership  
Prior to the liberalisation of incorporation law in the nineteenth century, most businesses 
constituted as common-law partnerships.  Such partnerships have basic economic problems 
which can hinder the growth of the business.  One of the key problems is that ownership is 
not separated from control, meaning that any owner can, independent of other owners, enter 
binding contracts and, in the process, hold-up co-owners.13  Since the separation of ownership 
and control is part of the very essence of the corporation, we should not be surprised to find 
ownership being separated from control in the era just after incorporation law is liberalised.  
                                                          
10
 Hilt, ‘When did ownership separate from control’. 
11
 Musacchio, Experiments, p. 126; Musacchio, ‘Laws versus contracts’. 
12
 Franks et al., ‘Equity markets’. 
13
 Lamoreaux, ‘Partnerships’. 
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However, as is well known, diffuse ownership and the separation of ownership from control 
give rise to agency problems and unless these can be ameliorated, ownership will not be 
diffuse.14  This raises the following question: what are the preconditions for the rise of diffuse 
ownership and the separation of ownership from control? 
According to the influential law and finance school, strong legal protection for 
minority shareholders enables ownership to separate from control.15 The basic argument is 
that with strong investor protection laws, large shareholders have less fear of expropriation if 
they ever lose control, and are therefore more willing to sell some of their control rights to 
raise funds or diversify their wealth, with the result that corporate ownership becomes 
diffuse.16 In their cross-country study, La Porta et al. find that public companies in countries 
with weak shareholder protection laws typically have concentrated ownership.17   
Coffee, Cheffins, and Franks et al. point out that the separation of ownership from 
control in the UK, which they reckon occurred at some stage between the 1930s and 1970s, 
happened before shareholder protection law was strengthened.18 The law and finance school 
has responded to this by arguing that shareholders were well protected in Britain for at least 
two reasons before the dispersion of ownership occurred.19   First, the UK’s commercial 
                                                          
14
 Jensen and Meckling, ‘Theory of the firm’; Shleifer and Vishny, ‘A survey’; La Porta et al., ‘Corporate 
ownership’. 
15
 La Porta et al., ‘Law and finance’, ‘Corporate ownership’ 
16
 La Porta et al., ‘Corporate ownership’, p. 473. 
17
 Even though their results no longer hold whenever their measure of shareholder protection is carefully 
recoded and even though others question the empirical basis of their work, the thesis of La Porta et al. regarding 
shareholder protection law as a precondition for diffuse ownership is still dominant.  See Spamann, 
‘Antidirector rights index’ and Holderness, ‘Myth of diffuse ownership’. 
18
 Cheffins, ‘History’, ‘Does law matter?’, Corporate Ownership; Coffee, ‘Rise of dispersed ownership’; Franks 
et al., ‘Ownership’. 
19
 La Porta et al., “Economic consequences,” p.319. 
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courts had a long history of precedents dealing with fraudulent behaviour and had a 
professional and trustworthy judiciary.  Second, the Directors Liability Act of 1890 and the 
Companies Act of 1900 required significant disclosure in prospectuses and held directors 
liable for inaccuracies.   
Although UK commercial courts may have had a long history of professional and 
incorrupt judges setting precedents, common-law judges in Victorian Britain were reluctant 
to interfere in what were perceived to be the internal affairs of companies in order to protect 
the interests of shareholders.20 Indeed, judges were ideologically opposed to the notion of 
protecting shareholders because laissez-faire theory and the practice of partnerships taught 
that capitalists could look after themselves.21  Such attitudes were clearly demonstrated in the 
precedent set in the famous case of Foss vs. Harbottle, whereby minority shareholders 
brought a case against their company’s directors for alleged wrongdoing and misapplication 
of company resources.22  The judge in this case ruled that when a company is allegedly 
wronged by its directors, only the company and not the shareholders have a right to sue.  In 
addition, the judge ruled that when a wrong could be ratified by a majority of shareholders, 
the court would not interfere, implying that individual shareholders could not proceed with an 
action against the company.  This important precedent strengthened the rights of directors and 
company insiders at the expense of minority shareholders.   
As our sample companies were registered under the 1862 Companies Act and as the 
vast majority of our observations are from before the above-mentioned strengthening of 
shareholder protection legislation at the turn of the twentieth century, we are able to look at 
the dispersion of ownership in an environment with very weak (by modern-day standards) 
                                                          
20
 See Emden, Shareholders’ Legal Guide, pp.77-80. 
21
 Jefferys, Business Organisation, p.394. 
22
 Foss vs Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 (Chancery Division) Wigram V-C. 
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shareholder protection.  It is a well-established fact that shareholder protection under the 
1862 Act was minimal.23  Until 1900, the anti-director rights index, which measures the 
extent to which company law protects minority shareholders, for companies registered under 
the 1862 Companies Act, was one out of a maximum of six.24  In addition, the ex post control 
of self-dealing index, which measures the strength of regulation relating to company 
transactions which involve a director or other insider, was very low by modern-day 
standards.25  Furthermore, insider trading was legal and the 1862 Act did not impose a 
compulsory audit upon companies.   
In summary, Victorian Britain is an ideal laboratory to test the law and finance 
hypothesis regarding corporate ownership, since there was very little shareholder protection 
enshrined in legislation or offered by the commercial courts.  Given this legal environment, 
we should not expect to find dispersed ownership if the law and finance hypothesis holds. 
According to Coffee, an important precondition for diffuse ownership is the 
emergence of a decentralized and pluralistic political regime.  Such a regime enables 
entrepreneurs to use private contracts to make credible commitments to minority 
                                                          
23
 Campbell and Turner, ‘Substitutes’. 
24
 Cheffins, Corporate Ownership, p. 36.  See La Porta et al. ‘Law and finance’, pp.1126-8 for further 
information on the anti-director rights index.  The 1862 Companies Act provided a list of default provisions for 
company constitutions in Table A of the Act, which correspond to three of the rights in the antidirector rights 
index (Companies Act 1862, Table A, s. 27, 32, 48).  However, companies had complete discretion when it 
came to including or excluding these provisions from their constitution, with the majority choosing to ignore 
some or all  (Campbell and Turner, ‘Substitutes’, p. 574). 
25
 Cheffins, Corporate Ownership, p. 38; See Djankov et al., ‘Law and economics’ on the construction of the 
self-dealing index. 
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shareholders, free from government interference.26 Well-functioning courts can simply ensure 
that companies do not deviate from their contracts with shareholders.   
By the Victorian era, Britain had a decentralized and pluralistic political regime.  The 
constitutional changes ushered in by the Glorious Revolution meant that political power was 
decentralised, and the Great Reform Act of 1832 enfranchised nearly all male property 
owners, thus signalling the beginning of the end for the aristocracy and patronage-based 
politics.  This new regime, infused by Benthamite ideals, increasingly liberalised the law of 
business organisation, making it easier for businesspeople to form companies, but it left 
shareholder protection to private contracting between parties.  If Coffee’s thesis is correct, we 
should expect to see diffuse ownership in Victorian Britain. 
 
3. The rise of the public company in the nineteenth century  
Although the corporate form existed in Britain prior to the nineteenth century, the right to 
incorporate was controlled by Parliament and the Crown, with the common-law courts 
largely hostile to attempts by entrepreneurs to form unincorporated companies.27 The 
liberalisation of British incorporation law commenced in the mid-1820s, with the repeal of 
the Bubble Act28 and the passage of the Banking Copartnership Act, which enabled banks to 
incorporate freely as joint-stock companies with unlimited shareholder liability.29  Parliament 
also dispensed corporate charters more liberally from the mid-1820s onwards in order to 
assist the growth of capital-intensive transportation and infrastructure projects which 
provided some sort of public good.  Parliament also ended the monopoly in marine insurance 
                                                          
26
 Coffee, ‘Rise of dispersed ownership’. 
27
 Freeman et al., Shareholder Democracies; Harris, Industrializing. 
28
 6 Geo. IV, c.91. 
29
 7 Geo. IV, c.46. 
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in 1824, permitting other companies to incorporate.30  As a result of this liberalisation, banks, 
insurance companies, and railways dominated the London equity market in 1850, accounting 
for 65.1 per cent of all issues and 80.1 per cent of market capitalisation.31  
  Railways typically had diffuse ownership due to their large capital requirements.32  In 
addition, many banks and insurance companies had diffuse ownership as there were self-
imposed restrictions, usually set at low levels, on the proportion of shares which one 
individual could own.33  The diffuseness of share ownership in banks and railways is 
illustrated by the number of shareholders they had.  The median number of shareholders 
amongst British joint-stock banks in 1855 was 400, with seven banks having more than 1,000 
shareholders.34  Similarly, railway companies quoted in the Course of the Exchange in 1855 
had a median of 1,364 shareholders, with eight having between 3,000 and 10,000, and three 
having in excess of 10,000 owners.35   
Although there are few surviving ownership records of banks, insurance companies, 
and railways from before 1855, the records which have survived suggest that ownership was 
diffuse.  For example, the capital owned by the largest shareholder and top five shareholders 
for companies for which we were able to locate ownership records is as follows: 1.5 and 7.3 
per cent for the Bradford Banking Company in 182736; 1.6 and 5.8 per cent for the Great 
                                                          
30
 Harris, Industrializing, p.211. 
31
 Acheson et al., ‘Rule Britannia’, p.1118. 
32
 Cheffins, Corporate Ownership, pp. 157-9. 
33
 See Acheson et al., ‘Does limited liability matter?’; Campbell and Turner, ‘Substitutes’, p.576. 
34
 Based on data from Banking Almanac and Yearbook (1855). 
35
 Returns of the Number of Proprietors in Each Railway Company in the United Kingdom (P. P. 1856, 
CCXXXVIII). 
36
 HSBC Archives, Deed of Copartnership of Bradford Banking Company. 
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Western Railway in 184337; 4.4 and 18.9 per cent for the Hampshire Banking Company in 
183538; 0.3 and 1.3 for the Guardian Insurance Company in both 1821 and 1845;39 2.3 and 
9.7 per cent for the Royal Exchange Assurance in 1838;40 2.0 and 9.8 per cent for the 
Sheffield and Hallamshire Bank in 183641; 4.4 and 14.0 per cent for the Union Bank of 
Scotland in 184142; 1.0 and 5.2 per cent for the Ulster Banking Company in 1836.43             
Incorporation law was liberalised further with the passage of the Companies Act of 
1844.44 This legislation granted firms the freedom to incorporate as unlimited liability 
companies.  Subsequently, the 1855 and 1856 Limited Liability Acts were passed which 
enabled companies, apart from banks and insurance companies, to incorporate with limited 
liability.45 Limited liability was eventually extended to banking in 1858,46 and insurance 
companies received this privilege due to their inclusion in the 1862 Companies Act,47 which 
                                                          
37
 National Archives, RAIL 251/28, 38 and 50, Great Western Railway holders of £100, £50 and £20 shares 
1843. 
38
 Lloyds-TSB Archives, 1085, Hampshire Banking Company Shareholders’ Register. 
39
 London Metropolitan Archive, CLC/B/107/ms18093.01-03, Guardian Shareholder Register 1821, 1845. 
40
 London Metropolitan Archive, CLC/B/107/MS16233/001-002, Royal Exchange Assurance Shareholder 
Register 1838. 
41
 HSBC Archives, 598/1-2, Share Registers of Sheffield and Hallamshire Bank, volumes 1 and 2. 
42
 HBOS Archive, NRA 1110/1/24/14, Union Banking Company, List of Shareholders, 1841. 
43
 Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, D/3499/CA/1, Ulster Banking Company Register of Shareholders. 
44
 7 & 8 Vict., c.110.  This Act liberalized incorporation law by permitting firms to incorporate without explicit 
State permission.  See Taylor, Creating Companies, pp.135-175 for a comprehensive account of the 
liberalisation of incorporation law between 1844 and 1862. 
45
 The 1855 Act (18 & 19 Vict., c.113) was repealed, but re-enacted in 1856 (19 & 20 Vict., c.47).   
46
 21 & 22 Vict. c.91. 
47
 25 & 26 Vict. c.89. 
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was effectively a consolidation of existing pieces of legislation.  The companies incorporated 
under this legislation are the focus of this paper.  
 
4. Ownership and control data 
Our main sources of ownership data are located in the Companies Registration Office files 
held at the National Archives at Kew (BT31 series) and the National Archives of Scotland 
(BT2 series).  Companies registered under the 1856 and 1862 Companies Acts were required 
annually to return a list of their shareholders to the Registrar of Companies.  Up until 1970, 
whenever a company was dissolved either because it was reconstructed, merged or liquidated, 
its ownership records were placed within the Companies Registration Office files.  As the 
vast majority of nineteenth-century companies registered under the 1856 and 1862 
Companies Acts were subsequently dissolved, their ownership records, if they survived, are 
contained within these two BT series.   Notably, as ownership data was not collected by the 
Registrar of Companies on statutory companies set up prior to 1862 (e.g., railways) and 
banks and insurance companies (unless they registered under the 1862 Companies Act), our 
dataset does not contain the largest publicly-traded companies in the Victorian era.      
Our search of the catalogues of the two BT series for public companies which issued 
common stock quoted either in the Course of the Exchange between 1825 and 1870 or in the 
Investor’s Monthly Manual in 1870, 1885, and 1899, returned records for 712 companies.  On 
inspection of these records, 101 contained no ownership returns.  Unfortunately, the 
ownership returns of English companies were extensively weeded by archivists in the past in 
13 
 
order to reduce the bulk of the files, with the result that only some annual returns have been 
preserved.48   
We collected ownership returns for 1865, 1870, 1883, 1890, and 1900 or one year 
either side of these sample years if the return existed.49  If they were available, 1880 or 1881 
were collected in those cases where a company had no returns for 1882-1884.  In addition, we 
collected all returns from the 1850s.50  If a company had ownership returns which fell outside 
the selected sample years, we collected a return for each decade between 1860 and 1900, 
where available.   
The ownership returns were usually completed by hand on Form E, a standardised 
return form, which gave a summary of capital and shares i.e., names and holdings of 
shareholders for both ordinary and preference shares.  We photographed 999 returns of Form 
E, which were then inputted manually and verified by data-entry services.  In total, after 
removing firm-years which have missing and unintelligible data, we have ownership returns 
for 890 firm-years, representing 488 unique firms. 
As we are interested in control as well as cash-flow rights, we collected data on each 
company’s voting scales for each year for which they are in our sample from their articles of 
association, Burdett’s Official Intelligence (BOI) and Stock Exchange Official Intelligence 
                                                          
48
 In principle, every first, last and intermediate fifth annual ownership register has been preserved, but in a 
significant minority of cases, we found this not to be the case.  The Scottish records have not been weeded to the 
same extent.   
49
 1883 was chosen as this was the year when the second edition of Burdett’s Official Intelligence, which was 
the first stock exchange yearbook in the UK with near-comprehensive director, company data, and market 
information.   
50
 Two shareholder returns for 1853 are included in our sample as these had been preserved in the archives.  
These were companies formed under the 1844 Companies Act which subsequently registered under the 1862 
Companies Act. 
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(SEOI).  These were then used to calculate each shareholder’s voting rights.  In total, we 
found the voting structures of 729 of the 890 firm-years of ownership returns.       
As the ownership returns do not report the membership of the board of directors, we 
obtained the names of directors for the relevant years from articles of association, BOI, SEOI, 
and Stock Exchange Year-book (SEY).  In total, we located director names for 575 out of the 
890 firm-years in our sample.  Each set of ownership returns was then manually scrutinized 
to ascertain the share ownership of each director. 
We also collected data on firm age, total paid-up capital, location of head office, share 
qualifications for directors, and nominal and par values of shares from articles of association, 
BOI, and SEOI.  The stock markets where shares were traded were obtained from BOI and 
SEOI for 1883 onwards, with the Investor’s Monthly Manual (IMM) being used for the 1864-
82 period.51 
As the source of our ownership data is the files of companies which were dissolved 
before the 1970s, we may be introducing a bias into our sample in that the ownership 
structure of such companies may be different from companies which were not dissolved 
before the 1970s, particularly if dissolution occurred for performance reasons.  Admittedly, 
very few companies established in the nineteenth century were still operating as independent 
entities by the 1970s.  Nevertheless, we checked all our sample companies against the 
Register of Defunct Companies, which lists any company which delisted from the stock 
                                                          
51
 If data on certain variables that were unlikely to change over time (i.e., establishment date, head office, 
number of markets where shares were traded, and director qualifications) were missing for a particular time 
period, but were available for that company for another time, we assumed the value remained the same. We ran 
robustness checks without this assumption, which reduced the number of observations, but our regression results 
remained the same. 
15 
 
exchange from 1875 onwards as well as the reason for delisting.52  The vast majority of 
sample companies were not dissolved for explicit performance reasons – 55.5 per cent 
reconstructed their capital or merged with another firm.  Only 27.7 per cent of our sample 
companies delisted for explicit performance reasons i.e., they were wound-up voluntarily or 
by court order.  Furthermore, for the sake of robustness, we partition our sample by the 
various reasons for firm dissolution to ensure that our results are not being driven by a 
performance bias.      
          <INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
From Table 1 we observe the following about our sample.  First, there is a good 
spread of companies across time, with slightly more observations in the 1880s and 1890s, 
which is unsurprising given the expansion of the stock market in these decades.53  Second, 
average company size changes little over the sample period, albeit that it is slightly lower in 
the 1860s and slightly higher in the 1900s.  Third, the average number of shareholders rises 
steadily over the sample period, which, taken with the fact that the average par value of firms 
changes little, suggests that ownership may have become more diffused over time.  Fourth, 
the relative size of the companies in our sample compared to all non-railway companies 
traded on the stock market indicates that very few companies in our sample are in the top two 
deciles of companies by par value in any particular year.54  As only a third of companies are 
in the top 50 per cent of the size distribution, our sample is mainly comprised of medium-
                                                          
52
 The Register of Defunct Companies, published in 1979, contains notices of companies removed from the 
Stock Exchange Yearbook between 1875 and 1979.  As a small number of companies were not covered by the 
Register of Defunct Companies, we used the London and Edinburgh Gazettes for these companies.  
53
 Grossman, ‘New indices’. 
54
 As the many railways traded on British stock markets were large, their inclusion in Table 1 would mean that 
there would be fewer of our sample companies in the top two deciles or the top half of the size distribution of 
public companies.   
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sized and small public companies, which immediately biases our sample against finding 
diffuse ownership since such companies would be expected to have more concentrated 
ownership than the large firms examined by Foreman-Peck and Hannah. 
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
From Table 2, we see that there is a good spread of companies from different 
industries.  The commercial and industrial sector is the largest in the sample, which is 
unsurprising as this was a growth sector in the stock market between 1860 and 1900.55  
 
5. Ownership structure in Victorian Britain 
The first thing worthy of note in Table 3, which contains statistics on the concentration of 
capital (cash-flow rights) and voting (control rights), is that ownership of Victorian 
companies was not concentrated either in terms of capital or voting.  Insiders, defined as 
directors and owners of more than 10 per cent of capital, on average owned 18.5 per cent of 
capital and controlled 16.1 per cent of votes.56  These results are being dominated by several 
highly concentrated companies since the median in both cases is substantially lower, being 
12.2 and 9.0 per cent respectively. The mean (and median) percentage of capital and voting 
rights owned by the largest five investors is 26.6 (21.5) and 22.2 (17.3) per cent, which is a 
further indication that ownership in Victorian Britain was relatively diffuse.  The Herfindahl 
Index of ownership and voting, which measures how dispersed ownership is across all 
                                                          
55
 Acheson et al., ‘Rule Britannia’, p.1118-9; Grossman, ‘New indices’, p.130. 
56
 10 per cent is chosen to define large shareholders following the usual convention in the extant literature 
(Cheffins et al., ‘Ownership dispersion’; Faccio and Lang, ‘The ultimate ownership’; La Porta et al, ‘Corporate 
ownership’).  
17 
 
shareholders, is low compared to similar measures for the twentieth century.57 This further 
illustrates the diffuseness of ownership amongst Victorian public companies.             
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE> 
A further thing worthy of note in Table 3 is that there is little difference between the 
concentration of capital and voting.  If anything, voting is slightly less concentrated than 
capital.  This finding is explained by the fact that many companies had voting regimes with 
caps which limited the total votes of each investor or which skewed the voting scale in favour 
of small investors and discriminated against large shareholders. 
 In terms of decomposing the concentration of capital and voting rights for insiders, 
Table 3 reveals that, on average, company directors (including directors who were large 
shareholders) owned 13.7 per cent of capital and 12.3 per cent of voting rights.  In other 
words, there was a substantial separation of ownership from control in Victorian Britain.  
Even when we consider the subset of companies which had a large shareholder, we see that 
the average capital and voting concentration of insiders was only 37.2 per cent and 39.7 per 
cent respectively.   
Table 4 gives a modern perspective to the concentration of ownership in Victorian 
Britain by comparing it to the capital concentration of constituents of leading stock-market 
indices in 2013.  As can be seen from Table 4, on any measure of capital concentration, 
ownership in Victorian Britain was as diffuse as that in modern large US corporations which 
are in the Dow Jones or S&P 500 indices.  Notably, ownership in Victorian Britain was 
slightly more diffuse than amongst FTSE 100 constituents in 2013.  Given that the companies 
in our ownership sample were nearly all outside the largest 100 companies in Victorian 
Britain, a more meaningful comparison would be with those indices for the US and UK 
                                                          
57
 According to Franks et al., ‘Ownership’, pp.4025-6, the mean of the Herfindahl index for their sample of UK 
firms in 1920, 1950, and 1990 was 10.6, 6.3, and 6.3 per cent respectively. 
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which contain medium-sized companies i.e., S&P 400 MID, S&P 600 SMALL, and FTSE 
250.  Compared to companies in these indices, companies in Victorian Britain were much 
less likely to have a single owner holding more than 10 per cent of shares.  The average 
proportion of capital held by the largest investor and largest five investors in Victorian 
Britain is smaller than in modern-day medium-sized US firms and is substantially smaller 
than in modern-day UK firms.   
<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE> 
The evidence in Table 4 reaffirms the well-established view that ownership is diffuse 
in the Anglo-Saxon world, but not elsewhere.58  However, it also contradicts the view that 
ownership diffusion in the UK is a twentieth-century phenomenon.   
Table 5 compares ownership concentration in the UK for the Victorian era with that 
for later periods.  Comparability across various ownership studies is not straightforward as 
some report cash flow rights but not voting rights and vice versa.  More fundamentally, 
however, studies which look at the twentieth century focus on the largest companies.  To the 
extent that comparisons can be made, we see that mean capital held by the largest investor 
was slightly higher in the twentieth century, which indicates that corporate ownership became 
a bit more concentrated during the twentieth century.  In terms of capital, directors in the first 
half of the twentieth century tended to own a smaller proportion of a company’s capital than 
they did in the nineteenth century.  However, the latter companies were larger and their 
voting was more concentrated than their capital.59  Notably, the figures for director ownership 
for 1990 and 1995, which contain industrial companies of various sizes, are comparable to 
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 La Porta et al. ‘Law and finance’, ‘Corporate ownership’; Faccio and Lang, ‘The ultimate ownership’. 
59
 For example, Hannah and Foreman-Peck, ‘Extreme divorce’ find that for the largest 337 British companies in 
1911, the mean percentage of voting rights controlled by directors was 10.1, which is just slightly below the 
mean for our sample. 
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the Victorian era.  Although ownership in our sample is more diffuse than the top 350 
companies in 2013 in terms of the capital held by the largest and twenty largest investors, 
directors owned greater amounts of capital in the Victorian era than they did in 2013.    
<INSERT TABLE 5 HERE> 
As can be clearly seen from Table 6, the low concentration of ownership and voting in 
Victorian Britain is not being driven by one or two industries.  All industries in Table 6 can 
be described more or less as having diffuse ownership.  The most diffuse sector in terms of 
capital concentration is banking and in terms of voting concentration, banking is joined by 
insurance and finance companies as the least concentrated.   
<INSERT TABLE 6 HERE> 
Banking, finance, and insurance companies typically structured their articles of 
association to ensure that they had diffuse ownership by restricting the amount of shares any 
one investor could own and / or by skewing their voting scales in favour of small investors.  
One reason for doing so was that such companies usually had uncalled capital or extended 
liability, and depositors and policy-holders with these companies may have preferred to see 
the company’s shares dispersed amongst many owners because there was less risk of many 
owners becoming bankrupt as compared to a few owners.60   Another possible reason is that 
the existence of a blockholder might discourage others from investing as such an owner could 
use their dominance to expropriate minority shareholders in a sector which is characterised 
by high levels of information asymmetry.  For example, such an owner could make loans or 
policies on preferential terms to themselves, family members, or other associates.       
As can be seen from Table 6, breweries are at the other end of the ownership 
concentration spectrum.  From 1870 onwards, breweries converted to public limited 
companies due to increased capital needs arising from technological changes which increased 
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 Acheson et al., ‘Does limited liability matter?’, p. 259. 
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the optimal size of breweries and the need for breweries to secure public houses following 
regulatory changes in the licensing of public houses which pushed up their cost.61  Unlike 
many other sectors in Table 6, the breweries were well-established businesses before they 
came to market and their original owners had a desire to maintain as much control as possible 
once their firms went public.62           
 Table 7 enables us to see whether capital and voting concentration change over time 
and as companies mature.  The first thing to note from Table 7 is that capital and voting 
concentration decline over time.  This suggests that capital and voting rights become more 
diffuse as companies mature, indicating that the secondary trading of shares may have led to 
reduced ownership concentration.63  As the finding of a decline in concentration could be 
driven by a cohort effect, Table 8 examines the changes in concentration of capital and voting 
for the 54 companies for which we have ownership census records before 1880 as well as 
after 1890.  Every measure of concentration in Table 8 suggests that concentration of voting 
and capital rights fell slightly over time.       
<INSERT TABLES 7 & 8 HERE> 
The second point of note from Table 7 is that as the nineteenth century progresses, the 
initial concentration of ownership and voting rights increases so that by the 1890s, the five 
largest investors on average have 43.8 per cent of capital and 42.9 per cent of voting rights, 
whereas in the 1860s the equivalent figures were 33.0 and 22.8 respectively.  The third thing 
to note is that voting rights are slightly less concentrated than capital over most of the sample 
period.  However, companies established in the 1890s appear to have more concentrated 
voting rights than capital by the 1900s. 
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 Jefferys, Business Organisation, p. 268. 
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 See Helwege et al., ‘Why do firms’ on this. 
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The question arises as to why ownership is much more concentrated for companies 
establishing in the final decade of our sample period.  One possibility is that the companies 
establishing in the 1890s are smaller.  However, the opposite is the case.  Another possibility 
is that the cohort is dominated by one industry.  No one industry dominates, but even if we 
remove the industry with the highest concentration (breweries), ownership is still much more 
concentrated for companies establishing in the 1890s.  In the SEOI and BOI, the companies in 
our sample incorporated in the 1890s were mainly described as being “registered” whereas in 
previous decades in our sample, the vast majority of companies are described as 
“established”.  In other words, what is different about the companies going public in the 
1890s is that they are conversions to public company status of established firms which were 
previously constituted as partnerships.  Given this trend in the 1890s, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that Chandler viewed many British industrial companies at the turn of the 
twentieth century as being family-controlled enterprises which were “personally managed”.64           
 Table 9 partitions our sample by the final status of the company to see whether our 
findings are being driven by a performance bias.  Notably, there are no substantial differences 
in capital and voting concentration across the various reasons as to why companies became 
defunct, which suggests that our results are not being driven by a performance bias.   
<INSERT TABLE 9 HERE> 
We established above that for most of our sample period, capital was more 
concentrated than voting.  As can be seen from Table 10, which shows how voting rights 
evolved over time, early in the sample period most companies had voting scales which 
penalised large investors, with the result that voting rights were more dispersed than capital.  
In other words, many companies had voting scales which placed a cap on the maximum 
number of votes which any one investor could have and / or had a graduated voting scale 
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22 
 
skewed against large owners (e.g., 5-10 shares = 1 vote; 10-25 = 2 votes; 25-50 shares = 3 
votes; 50-100 shares = 4 votes; 100-200 shares = 5 votes; and one vote for every additional 
200 hundred shares). As can be seen from Table 10, these types of scale became less common 
amongst companies established in the 1870s and 1880s, and by the 1890s only 19.1 per cent 
of companies in our sample operated such voting scales.  In other words, the majority of 
companies established in the second half of our sample period operated linear voting schemes 
i.e., one-share-one-vote schemes or x-shares-one-vote schemes.      
<INSERT TABLE 10 HERE> 
The existence of non-voting preference shares concentrates voting rights to ordinary 
shareholders, making voting rights relatively more concentrated than capital.  As can be seen 
from Table 10, preference shares were not used much by companies established in the 1850s, 
1860s, or 1870s, but they were increasingly popular amongst companies established in the 
1880s, and were particularly popular with companies established in the 1890s.  The 
popularity of preference shares amongst these companies explains why voting rights were 
more concentrated than capital for companies established in the latter part of our sample 
period.     
 Table 11, which partitions our sample by voting structure, shows that the presence of 
voting scales skewed against large owners meant that voting was much less concentrated than 
capital in those companies.  For example, insiders in such companies had, on average, 17.3 
per cent of capital, but only 10.2 per cent of votes. The presence of preference shares and 
regular voting scales meant that voting rights were much more concentrated than capital.  For 
example, insiders in firms with linear voting scales and preference shares had, on average, 
20.3 per cent of capital, but controlled 28.8 per cent of votes.   
<INSERT TABLE 11 HERE> 
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   In the Victorian era, it was extremely common for companies to have substantial 
directorial share ownership requirements included in their articles of association.65  From 
Table 12, we see that average directorial qualifications were very low relative to the overall 
capital of the company, which suggests that they did not affect ownership concentration.  
Indeed, the average director in companies with share qualifications owned a slightly higher 
proportion of shares than required.  Finally, from Table 12 we see that directorial 
requirements were set low enough that, on average, 29.3 per cent of shareholders had enough 
shares to become directors, which suggests that directorial qualifications were not a means 
for large shareholders to secure control without needing votes.           
<INSERT TABLE 12 HERE> 
 
6. Determinants of ownership structure  
In general, ownership structure was diffuse in Victorian Britain, but there was a wide 
variation in ownership structure across sample firms, which raises the question as to the 
potential determinants of ownership structure.66 In this section, we explore econometrically 
the potential determinants of ownership structure in our sample.  In particular, we examine 
the relationship between concentration of capital and voting and firm-specific factors, 
industry, geography, voting structures, the size and incentives of boards of directors, and the 
stock markets where shares were traded.  Even though we have more than one observation for 
some companies, causal inference is hampered by the fact that most variables of interest do 
not change, giving us no variation which could be exploited to overcome partially the 
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 Campbell and Turner, ‘Substitutes’, p. 582; Chadwyck-Healey, Treatise, p.134; Emden, Shareholders’ legal 
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 For the extant literature on this question, see Shleifer and Vishny, ‘Large shareholders’; Demsetz and Lehn, 
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exogeneity issue.  For example, firms typically did not change over time their voting 
structures, the number of markets where their shares were traded, director incentives, and the 
location of their head office.  Consequently, in our analysis we can only show correlations 
between variables.  If anything, our evidence is consistent with the idea that ownership 
structure and many of these variables were codetermined when the company was initially 
established. 
         The dependent variables in our multivariate regressions are the logs of the percentage of 
capital and voting rights held by insiders, the percentage of capital and voting rights held by 
largest five shareholders, and the Herfindahl index of capital and voting rights.  As well as 
the various independent variables mentioned above, we also control for the ultimate fate of 
the company to ensure that the results are not being driven by a performance bias. Variables 
descriptions and data sources are reported in Appendix Table 1.  The results from Ordinary 
Least Squares regressions are reported in Table 13 and these results are robust to the use of 
panel specifications with random effects. 
<INSERT TABLE 13> 
 The statistically significant positive coefficients on the EstablishmentDate variable in 
Table 13 confirms our earlier findings that older firms have lower capital and voting 
concentration.  The statistically significant negative coefficients on the OwnershipDate 
variable indicate that ownership becomes less concentrated as the nineteenth century 
progresses.   
Size is usually regarded as an important determinant of ownership structure.67  Large 
firms have a need for larger capital resources, implying that the value of a given fraction of 
ownership will be higher, reducing capital concentration.  This effect on ownership will be 
accentuated if investors are risk averse as they will want to diversify their wealth.  As can be 
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seen from Table 13, there is little statistical or economic relationship between ownership 
structure and firm size.  One explanation for this finding is that as one of the main benefits of 
incorporating is that ownership can be separated from control, one should not expect firm 
size to be an important determinant of ownership structure.  Another explanation is that the 
amount of capital or votes controlled by insiders was almost immaterial from the point of 
view of actual control of the company. 
The presence of uncalled capital, whereby investors are liable for the debts of the 
company up to some fixed sum, could potentially result in more diffuse ownership as 
investors are reluctant to take large stakes because of the liability which is attached to share 
ownership or it could result in concentrated ownership as it lowers the costs of monitoring 
co-owners to ensure that they have adequate wealth to pay potential calls.68  As can be seen 
from Table 13, the presence of uncalled capital is uncorrelated with ownership structure.   
Some companies in Victorian Britain had their shares traded on more than one stock 
market, with listings in one or more of the many provincial stock exchanges and London 
commonplace right from the firm’s establishment.  As can be seen from the negative and 
statistically significant coefficient on the NumMarkets variable, the greater the number of 
markets a company’s shares were traded on, the less concentrated was its capital and voting.       
 Hannah claims that the two-thirds listing rule of the London Stock Exchange, 
whereby companies wanting to have a prestigious Official Listing had to place at least two-
thirds of their shares in the hands of the public, played an important role in separating 
ownership from control.69  However, the regression results in Table 13 suggest that there is 
no correlation between being on the Official List and ownership concentration, which 
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test which rejects Hannah’s hypothesis. 
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questions the role played by official listing requirements in separating ownership from 
control.70    
The results in Table 13 reveal that companies with a head office in London tended to 
have less capital and voting concentrated in the hands of insiders.  One possible explanation 
for this finding is that companies located in London had greater access to capital and were 
more attractive to investors with the result that there was less capital concentrated in the 
hands of insiders.   
Three of the six coefficients on the LocalMiles variable, which measures the distance 
between a company’s head office and the main stock exchange where its shares were traded, 
are statistically significant, and each of these coefficients is positive but very small in an 
economic sense. This finding suggests that the proximity of investors to a company is 
uncorrelated with ownership structure.  This is inconsistent with the view that diffuse 
ownership is more likely whenever shareholders can easily monitor a company’s directors.  It 
is also inconsistent with the notion that trust may be higher amongst investors living in 
proximity to companies and their directors.71 
Unsurprisingly, specifications 1 and 4 in Table 13 reveal that the greater the number 
of directors, the more concentrated is percentage of capital and votes controlled by insiders 
(i.e., directors and large shareholders).  However, the results in the other four specifications 
of Table 13 reveal that the greater the number of board members, the lower is the 
concentration of capital and voting as measured by the percentage held by the largest five 
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investors and the Herfindahl index.  One possible explanation for this finding is that larger 
boards may alleviate the agency problems that are associated with diffuse ownership as the 
greater the number of directors, the greater the cost of collusion with executive directors and 
the greater the degree of mutual monitoring conducted by directors.72  In addition, the 
existence of directorial share qualifications in most companies meant that the greater the 
number of directors, the greater the incentives of directors to monitor company executives.73      
One would expect that the presence of directorial ownership requirements would be 
positively correlated with ownership concentration as directors have to own a certain amount 
of shares before they can qualify as directors.  As can be seen from Table 13, the positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on DirQualScale suggests this is indeed the case. 
The two variables which attempt to capture the voting structures of companies 
(NonVotePreference and VotingNonLinear) reveal that neither has an effect on capital 
concentration (specifications 1 to 3), but that the presence of voting schemes which 
discriminate against large investors results in less concentrated voting rights (specifications 4 
to 6), which is consistent with the findings reported in the previous section. 
According to Demsetz and Lehn, companies located in an industry where it is difficult 
to assess and monitor managerial performance should have more concentrated ownership.74  
Given the asymmetric information problems endemic in financial institutions, one might 
expect more concentrated ownership in this industry.  In addition, the information 
asymmetries between managers and shareholders would be large in the mining industry given 
that many mines were located overseas or far away from stock markets.  On the other hand, 
utilities, which were usually local monopolies characterised by stable prices, technology and 
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market share, should have more diffuse ownership.  The industry binary variables in Table 13 
reveal that none of these relationships hold in Victorian Britain.  Indeed, financial institutions 
have much more diffuse ownership than other sectors, possibly arising from the fact that 
some banks and insurance companies limited the amount of shares that any one individual 
could own.      
In summary, our regression results suggest that time was an important determinant of 
ownership structure, with concentration eroding within each cohort, but companies 
established later in the century began their corporate lives with higher levels of concentration. 
The diffusion of ownership was aided by not only having a head office in London, but also by 
the listing of shares on numerous regional stock exchanges. Boards of directors also seem to 
have played a role in facilitating the diffusion of ownership, possibly by taking on the 
monitoring functions of large shareholders, as evidenced by the negative relationship between 
board size and concentration.  Non-linear voting rights, which penalised large investors, were 
also associated with lower levels of voting concentration.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The main findings of this paper are fivefold.  First, relative to modern-day standards for large 
publicly-traded companies, never mind medium-sized and small companies, Victorian Britain 
had highly dispersed ownership, with ownership being separated from control.  If one 
believes that separating ownership from control is one of the definitive features of the 
corporation, this finding is, in one sense, not that surprising.  Second, given the limited 
shareholder protection afforded by the 1862 Companies Act, the dispersed nature of 
ownership in this period is evidence against the law and finance hypothesis, which argues 
that strong shareholder law is a prerequisite for dispersed ownership.  Third, our findings of 
dispersed ownership in Victorian Britain are consistent with Coffee’s thesis that having a 
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pluralistic and decentralised political regime is a major precondition for dispersed ownership.  
Fourth, we find that the variations in ownership structure were correlated with several other 
factors. A diffuse ownership structure was more likely to be found in companies which had 
larger boards and a head office in London, and whose shares were traded on a number of 
stock markets. Fifth, although concentration of ownership tended to erode within each cohort 
over time, companies formed in the 1890s had greater capital and voting concentration than 
those formed in earlier decades, and, unlike companies formed in earlier decades, the insiders 
in these companies were able to maintain their voting rights.  Future research should focus on 
companies established from the 1890s onwards to understand why this change occurred and 
the long-run effect of it on the UK’s corporate economy.          
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Table 1: Sample Summary Statistics  
 
Relative size of companies compared to 
all non-railway companies in Investor’s Monthly Manual  
  
Year Top 10% 
Top 
20% 
Top 
50% 
Bottom 
50% 
Total  
companies 
in sample 
 
Average 
company 
size 
£(000)s 
Average 
number of 
shareholders  
1853-1868     144 154.1 312.4 
1869-1879 7 16 52 79 131 211.0 333.5 
1880-1889 12 25 104 159 263 210.4 373.4 
1890-1899 1 14 77 139 216 220.3 464.7 
1900-1902 2 9 34 84 118 244.3 594.9 
Total 1869-1902 22 64 267 461 728 218.9 429.2 
Total 1853-1902     872 208.2 409.9 
Missing Par     18  458.0 
Whole sample     890  410.9 
Source: Investor’s Monthly Manual, 1868-1902, which was available from International Center for Finance at Yale 
University.  See text for sources of shareholder numbers. 
Notes: The relative size of companies compared to non-railway companies is the average of the yearly figures.  Company 
size is measured in terms of the par value of its equity.  There are 18 of the 890 firm years for which we do not have accurate 
data on their par value.  
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Table 2: Industry Breakdown of Sample  
 
1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s Total 
        
Banks 1 30 25 46 26 14 142 
Breweries 0 3 4 7 15 8 37 
Commercial and Industrial 4 54 32 62 64 33 249 
Docks 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 
Finance 2 11 7 6 3 1 30 
Gas and Light 4 9 4 9 9 6 41 
Insurance 1 8 10 14 12 5 50 
Iron, Coal and Steel 0 5 9 25 18 10 67 
Mines 2 11 5 11 11 8 48 
Mortgage and Finance 0 3 3 34 23 15 78 
Spinning and Weaving 0 3 1 17 12 2 35 
Steamships 0 8 4 12 5 8 37 
Tea and Coffee 0 8 3 2 3 0 16 
Telegraph 1 1 5 7 3 2 19 
Tramways 0 0 2 9 9 4 24 
Wagon 0 2 1 4 5 2 14 
        
Total 15 156 115 267 218 119 890 
Source: See text. 
Notes: The industry classification used above is that used by contemporary stock exchange manuals such as the 
Stock Exchange Official Intelligence. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Capital and Voting Concentration (%) 
Companies 
Average 
no. per 
company 
Mean St. dev. Min. Median Max. 
Panel A: Capital Concentration 
Herfindahl 846  3.9 6.3 0.1 1.8 83.7 
        % held by largest 
       
 
Investor 846 
 
10.5 10.7 0.4 6.8 91.3 
 
5 investors 846 
 
26.6 17.0 1.9 21.5 98.7 
 
10 investors 846 
 
36.8 19.4 3.9 32.4 100.0 
 
20 investors 846 
 
49.1 21.2 7.8 46.0 100.0 
         % held by insiders (all companies for which director and capital data available) 
 
just directors (a) 575 5.8 8.8 6.2 0.0 7.3 44.7 
 
just large shareholder (b) 575 0.3 4.8 11.9 0.0 0.0 86.5 
 
both director and large sh (c) 575 0.3 4.9 12.8 0.0 0.0 91.3 
 
insider (a+b+c) 575 6.4 18.5 17.9 0.8 12.2 98.0 
         % held by insiders (for those companies which have a large shareholder) 
 
just director (a) 196 4.8 8.9 6.6 0.0 7.2 44.7 
 
just large shareholder (b) 196 0.8 14.1 16.9 0.0 10.6 86.5 
 
both director and large sh (c) 196 0.8 14.2 18.6 0.0 10.8 91.3 
 
insider (a+b+c) 196 6.3 37.2 18.3 11.4 33.8 98.0 
Panel B: Voting Concentration 
Herfindahl 729  3.5 8.1 0.0 1.4 100.0 
        % held by largest 
       
 
Investor 729 
 
8.6 11.6 0.0 4.9 100.0 
 
5 investors 729 
 
22.2 18.2 0.2 17.3 100.0 
 
10 investors 729 
 
31.1 20.7 0.5 26.7 100.0 
 
20 investors 729 
 
42.6 22.6 1.0 40.5 100.0 
         % held by insiders (all companies for which director and voting data available) 
 
just director (a) 559 5.9 8.0 6.3 0.0 6.2 34.4 
 
just large shareholder (b) 559 0.2 3.7 11.7 0.0 0.0 100.0 
 
both director and large sh (c) 559 0.2 4.3 13.3 0.0 0.0 91.3 
 
insider (a+b+c) 559 6.3 16.1 18.4 0.5 9.0 100.0 
         % held by insiders (for those companies which have a large shareholder) 
 
just director (a) 142 4.5 8.1 6.0 0.0 6.7 26.8 
 
just large shareholder (b) 142 0.7 14.7 19.6 0.0 10.5 100.0 
 
both director and large sh (c) 142 0.9 16.9 22.1 0.0 11.6 91.3 
 
insider (a+b+c) 142 6.2 39.7 21.6 11.4 33.7 100.0 
  
       
Source: see text. 
Notes: 44 of our firm-years have multiple classes of shares (i.e., ordinary and preference shares) where it has proved impossible 
to match up shareholder names of different classes in order to work out capital concentration for all 890 firm-years.  However, 
we can calculate the concentration of voting rights for such firms, provided we have the company’s voting scale. The 
Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squared proportion of capital owned by each investor in a company. Large shareholders are 
defined as those who own more than 10 per cent of capital in a firm for capital data or 10 per cent of votes for voting data.  
Insiders are defined as directors plus owners with more than 10 per cent of capital.   
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Table 4: Capital Concentration of Companies in Market Indices in 2013  
   
 
   
 
% of 
companies 
with a single 
shareholder 
owning more 
than 10% 
 
 % held by largest 
investor  
% held by 5 largest 
investors 
 
 Median Mean 
 
Median Mean 
   
 
     
Dow Jones 20.0   7.1 9.6  24.6 27.4 
S&P 500 37.3   8.6 10.3  30.9 32.5 
FTSE 100 50.5   10.0 16.0  28.9 35.5 
DAX 30 51.7   10.9 16.2  30.8 32.0 
S&P MidCap 400 51.8   10.2 11.3  34.1 35.7 
CAC 40 57.9   11.7 18.7  31.0 33.7 
S&P SmallCap 600 60.3   10.8 12.5  37.8 39.1 
FTSE 250 75.1   14.1 18.1  40.3 43.8 
S&P Asia 77.6   18.0 25.2  38.1 42.1 
MDAX 79.2   25.8 32.9  45.4 49.3 
Ibovespa  81.0   22.3 25.6  50.4 49.7 
CAC Mid 60 88.3   29.8 33.6  54.1 50.5 
         
Victorian Britain 35.6 
 
 6.8 10.5  21.5 26.6 
   
 
     
Source: Bloomberg and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The Dow Jones consists of 30 large US corporations.  The S&P 500 is an index of 500 large US corporations, the S&P 
MidCap 400 is an index of 400 midcap US corporations, and the S&P SmallCap 600 is an index of 600 smallcap US 
corporations.  The FTSE 100 is an index of the 100 largest companies traded on the London Stock Exchange, whereas the 
FTSE 250 consists of companies ranked 101 to 350 in terms on size on the London market.  The DAX 30 consists of 30 major 
German companies trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and the MDAX consists of 50 German companies (excluding 
technology companies) just outside the top 30 German companies.  The CAC 40 consists of the 40 most significant companies 
traded on the Paris Bourse and the CAC Mid 60 is a midcap index for the Paris Bourse, which consists of the 60 largest 
companies outside of the top 60 companies.  The S&P Asia consists of 50 large companies drawn from Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea, and Taiwan.  The IBovespa consists of the top 50 companies traded on the São Paulo Stock Exchange.   
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Table 5: Capital and Voting Concentration in Britain, 1855-2013 
  % held by largest investor % held by 20 largest investors % held by directors 
Years N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1853-1880 95 12.17(c) 8.37(c) 56.20(c) 57.60(c) 18.22(c) 12.67(c) 
1881-1902 480 10.14(c) 6.35(c) 45.51(c) 43.04(c) 12.78(c) 9.05(c) 
1853-1902 575 10.48(c) 6.63(c) 47.27(c) 44.30(c) 13.68(c) 9.45(c) 
1911 337 - - - - 6.61(c) 2.45(c) 
1936 92 16.27(v) 9.80(v) 40.47(v) 34.20(v) 9.83(c) 2.85(c) 
1951 98 13.02(v) 5.50(v) 30.67(v) 21.00(v) 6.53(c) 1.15(c) 
1983 470 15.86(c) - 60.47(c) - - - 
1990 225 - - - - 12.91(c) 6.27(c) 
1995 802 18.82 (c) - - - 13.02 (c) - 
2013 350 17.49(c) 13.26(c) 72.54(c) 73.36(c) 3.85(c) 0.41(c) 
Sources: For the 1853-1902 data see text.  The 1911 data consist of the largest 337 companies from that year 
and is from the online web appendix to Foreman-Peck and Hannah, ‘Extreme divorce’.  The 1936 and 1951 
figures are based on data from the statistical appendix in Florence, Ownership, pp. 196-217.  Florence’s 1936 
and 1951 samples contain all non-financial and non-conglomerate companies with an issued share capital in 
excess of £3m in 1951.  The 1983 data are from Leech and Leahy, ‘Ownership structure’, 1428.  Their sample 
consists of 470 UK-listed companies from a range of industries, with 325 coming from The Times 1000 largest 
industrial companies. The 1990 data are from Short and Keasey, ‘Managerial ownership’, p. 91.  Their sample 
consists of 225 industrial companies on the London Stock Exchange official list.  The 1995 data are from Davies 
et al., ‘Ownership structure’, p. 651.  Their sample consists of 802 non-financial companies.  The 2013 data are 
from authors’ calculations based on data from Bloomberg for the largest 350 companies traded on the London 
Stock Exchange.  
Notes: Capital (c) and voting (v) concentration.  The sample size for the 1853-1902 data is limited to those 
companies where we have information on director ownership data. 
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Table 6: Average Capital and Voting Concentration by Industry 
   
 
Capital Concentration  
 
Voting Concentration 
      
N 
 
% held by  
Insiders 
 
 
% held by  
Largest 5 Investors 
 
Herfindahl 
Index (%) 
 
% held by  
Insiders 
 
% held by  
Largest 5 Investors 
 
Herfindahl 
Index (%) 
Banks 140 
 
11.7 16.1 1.3 
 
9.3 11.6 1.1 
Breweries 35 
 
26.1 40.7 7.6 
 
33.7 39.7 9.3 
Commercial and Industrial 231 
 
23.1 32.0 4.8 
 
20.1 26.9 4.7 
Docks 2 
 
34.7 37.9 3.9 
 
29.3 35.3 3.6 
Finance 29 
 
16.3 23.3 2.6 
 
12.0 14.9 1.5 
Gas and Light 36 
 
15.4 22.9 3.0 
 
14.3 19.0 3.2 
Insurance 50 
 
17.1 22.3 3.7 
 
10.9 11.9 1.1 
Iron, Coal and Steel 65 
 
20.9 33.8 5.7 
 
19.0 30.2 4.5 
Mines 47 
 
17.6 27.3 3.7 
 
12.2 21.2 2.9 
Mortgage and Finance 73 
 
14.2 22.8 3.2 
 
11.9 18.5 2.5 
Spinning and Weaving 35 
 
23.5 22.1 2.4 
 
21.4 24.8 3.0 
Steamships 37 
 
19.1 26.5 4.7 
 
20.5 26.0 5.3 
Tea and Coffee 15 
 
12.9 32.7 4.0 
 
6.8 21.7 2.2 
Telegraph 18 
 
22.3 31.5 7.1 
 
13.8 22.4 5.1 
Tramways 19 
 
14.8 23.4 4.9 
 
11.6 20.3 3.9 
Wagon 14 
 
20.5 25.4 2.8 
 
17.6 22.7 2.5 
          
Total 846 
 
18.5 26.6 3.9 
 
16.1 22.2 3.5 
          
Source: see text. 
Notes: Number of observations varies per measure depending on data availability.
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Table 7: Capital and Voting Concentration by Establishment Date and Ownership Census Date 
Panel A: Capital Concentration 
  % of Capital Owned by 5 Largest Investors    Number of Observations 
  Decade in which ownership census taken    Decade in which ownership census taken 
 
 
1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s Total 
   
1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s Total 
 
                 
Decade in 
which 
company 
established 
<=1850s 20.1 20.4 20.2 17.8 10.5 12.1 16.2 
  
<=1850s 8 15 13 38 21 20 115 
1860s . 33.0 30.1 26.2 24.8 23.9 29.1 
  
1860s 0 105 66 64 47 16 298 
1870s . . 33.5 26.9 25.0 19.9 25.9 
  
1870s 0 0 16 72 47 24 159 
1880s . . . 31.3 26.9 19.7 27.0 
  
1880s 0 0 0 52 52 30 134 
1890s . . . . 43.8 32.7 38.5 
  
1890s 0 0 0 0 23 21 44 
 
                  
 Overall 20.1 31.4 29.3 26.2 26.1 21.4 26.6 
  
Overall 8 120 95 226 190 111 750 
Panel B: Voting Concentration 
  % of Voting Rights Controlled by 5 Largest Investors 
   
Number of Observations 
  Decade in which ownership census taken    Decade in which ownership census taken 
 
 
1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s Total 
   
1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s Total 
 
                  
Decade in 
which 
company 
established 
<=1850s 12.2 10.6 6.8 10.1 8.8 7.4 9.2 
  
<=1850s 5 12 10 35 21 19 102 
1860s . 22.8 23.5 21.0 19.3 21.4 21.9 
  
1860s 0 98 61 68 46 15 288 
1870s . . 26.5 23.7 22.4 17.5 22.8 
  
1870s 0 0 16 68 43 18 145 
1880s . . . 29.4 24.7 20.8 25.5 
  
1880s 0 0 0 50 50 32 132 
1890s . . . . 42.9 41.4 42.3 
  
1890s 0 0 0 0 26 21 47 
 
                  
 Overall 12.2 21.5 22.2 22.0 23.6 22.0 22.3 
  
Overall 5 110 87 221 186 105 714 
Source: see text. 
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Table 8: Analysis of Change in Capital and Voting Concentration for those 
Companies with Ownership Data both before 1880 and after 1890 
     
 
Number of  
Companies 
Mean 
Pre-1880 
Mean 
Post-1890 Difference 
     
Capital Concentration     
% held by Insiders 12 22.9 15.6 -7.2 
% held by Largest 5 Investors 54 27.0 22.0 -5.0 
Herfindahl Index (%) 54 3.2 2.5 -0.7 
     
Voting Concentration     
% held by Insiders 12 19.8 10.2 -9.6 
% held by Largest 5 Investors 50 20.1 17.3 -2.8 
Herfindahl Index (%) 50 2.4 1.7 -0.7 
     
Source: see text. 
Notes: Insiders are defined as directors plus owners with more than 10 per cent of capital.  The Herfindahl Index 
is the sum of the squared proportion of capital owned by each investor in a company.  
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Table 9: Capital and Voting Concentration by Final Status of the Company 
  
Average 
Year in 
which 
became 
Defunct 
 
% held by Insiders  % held by Largest 5 Investors  
Herfindahl Index 
(%) 
Company’s final status N Capital Votes Capital Votes Capital Votes 
Merged 353 1913  17.9 17.2  24.7 21.5  3.8 4.0 
Reconstructed 140 1903  15.7 13.9  25.6 21.5  3.6 2.9 
Removed from SEY 150 1911  20.1 16.7  29.2 25.6  4.4 3.8 
Court Winding Up 47 1902  22.2 14.2  28.1 22.2  3.7 2.5 
Voluntary Winding Up 199 1906  19.5 15.2  28.4 21.4  3.9 3.1 
            
Total 889 1909 
 
18.5 16.1  26.6 22.2  3.9 3.5 
            
Source: see text. 
Notes: Number of observations varies per measure depending on data availability.  Insiders are defined as directors or owners with more than 10 per cent of 
capital.  The Herfindahl Index is the sum of the proportion of capital owned by each investor in a company. Removed from SEY are those firms which have 
been removed from the Stock Exchange Yearbook for some reason other than those listed above.  The most likely explanation for their disappearance is that 
these companies went private. 
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Table 10: Percentage of Companies with Particular Voting Structures by 
Decade in which Company was Established 
 
 
  
Decade in which  
firm established 
 
 
N 
Non-Linear Voting Rights  
(%) 
Existence of  
Non-voting 
Preference Shares (%) 
 
 
 
  
<=1850s 102 68.6 6.9 
1860s 288 58.7 5.9 
1870s 145 31.0 15.2 
1880s 132 29.5 22.7 
1890s 47 19.1 42.6 
 
   
Total 714 46.5 13.4 
 
 
  
Source: see text. 
Notes: Non-Linear Voting Rights penalise large investors and make voting rights relatively more disperse than 
capital.  The way in which this could be achieved would be to have a graduated voting scale or a cap on the 
maximum number of votes in the hands of any individual shareholder. 
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Table 11: Average Capital and Voting Concentrations by Voting Structures 
 
 
 
          
Voting Structures  % held by 
Insiders  
% held by 
Largest 5 Investors  Herfindahl Index (%) 
 
 
 
           
Voting Rights  
Non-Linear 
 
Existence of  
Non-voting 
Preference Shares 
 
 
N Capital Votes  N Capital Votes 
 
N Capital Votes 
 
 
 
   
 
       
No No  236 19.0 19.4  307 27.6 27.8  307 4.3 4.4 
Yes No  223 17.3 10.2  313 25.5 14.4  313 3.6 1.9 
No Yes  50 20.3 28.8  52 28.6 37.0  52 4.3 9.9 
Yes Yes  11 13.2 14.0  13 19.4 17.0  13 2.2 2.9 
 
 
            
 Overall  520 18.3 16.3  685 26.5 22.2  685 4.0 3.6 
 
 
 
           
Source: see text. 
Notes: The first row is usually a basic one-vote-per-share or x-votes-per-share arrangement with no preference shares. The small difference between capital and voting 
concentration is that for some companies it may have been one vote for five shares, so anyone holding four shares did not get a vote, those holding nine shares only got one 
vote etc.. Insiders are defined as directors, or owners with more than 10 per cent of capital.  The Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squared proportion of capital owned by 
each investor in a company.  The sample in this table is restricted to companies where both capital and voting data available. 
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Table 12: Directors’ Qualifications and Holdings 
 
No. companies with:  
Average director qualifications and 
holdings for companies with 
qualifications:  
%  of shareholders eligible 
to become directors  
No 
qualifications 
Qualifications 
 
 
Qual. 
(% of firm) 
Holdings 
(% of firm) 
 
  
1850s 0 2  0.4 1.2  16.3 
1860s 1 58  0.8 3.5  39.3 
1870s 0 17  0.9 2.8  33.4 
1880s 72 159  0.5 2.7  27.4 
1890s 35 151  0.4 2.7  27.9 
1900s 24 89  0.3 1.7  27.9 
   
 
  
 
 
Total 132 476  0.5 2.6  29.3 
   
 
  
 
 
Source: see text. 
Notes: The sample in this table is restricted to those companies where directorial ownership and qualifications are known. 
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Table 13: Regression Results 
 Capital Concentration  Voting Concentration 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 % held by 
Insiders 
% held by 
5 largest investors 
Herfindahl 
Index 
 % held by 
Insiders 
% held by 
5 largest investors 
Herfindahl 
Index 
        
OwnershipDate -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.023***  -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.019*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
EstablishmentDate 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.020***  0.019*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Size 0.057 0.039 0.042  0.060 0.003 0.019 
 (0.053) (0.032) (0.057)  (0.055) (0.038) (0.058) 
Uncalled -0.000 -0.003 -0.002  0.001 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
OfficialListing 0.137 0.019 0.163  0.099 0.118 0.208 
 (0.174) (0.094) (0.160)  (0.145) (0.099) (0.144) 
NumMarkets -0.318*** -0.108*** -0.218***  -0.267*** -0.135*** -0.242*** 
 (0.056) (0.032) (0.057)  (0.052) (0.040) (0.057) 
HeadLondon -0.483*** -0.146* -0.172  -0.447*** -0.235** -0.180 
 (0.156) (0.085) (0.145)  (0.134) (0.097) (0.130) 
Scottish -0.150 -0.163** -0.147  -0.104 -0.208** -0.051 
 (0.119) (0.077) (0.137)  (0.131) (0.102) (0.137) 
LocalMiles 0.002* 0.001 0.001  0.002** -0.000 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
NumDirectors 0.024* -0.052*** -0.068***  0.033** -0.054*** -0.067*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.017)  (0.015) (0.012) (0.017) 
DirectorQualScale 0.374*** 0.229*** 0.348***  0.436*** 0.256*** 0.377*** 
 (0.079) (0.053) (0.079)  (0.084) (0.065) (0.086) 
NonVotePreference -0.015 -0.125 -0.212  0.062 0.040 0.105 
 (0.167) (0.091) (0.168)  (0.145) (0.083) (0.139) 
VotingNonLinear -0.034 -0.022 -0.015  -0.556*** -0.719*** -0.718*** 
 (0.092) (0.054) (0.093)  (0.091) (0.070) (0.095) 
IndustryMines 0.113 0.042 -0.112  0.164 0.024 -0.088 
 (0.248) (0.129) (0.214)  (0.234) (0.145) (0.213) 
IndustryUtility -0.111 -0.063 -0.145  0.215 0.103 0.041 
 (0.196) (0.122) (0.224)  (0.167) (0.114) (0.197) 
IndustryFinancial -0.401*** -0.249*** -0.469***  -0.342*** -0.269*** -0.435*** 
 (0.100) (0.066) (0.117)  (0.106) (0.078) (0.110) 
IndustryBreweries -0.341 0.088 0.070  0.157 0.118 0.170 
 (0.319) (0.132) (0.258)  (0.294) (0.128) (0.272) 
Merged 0.248** 0.117* 0.209*  0.299*** 0.137** 0.244** 
 (0.102) (0.060) (0.109)  (0.102) (0.067) (0.106) 
CourtWoundup 0.368* 0.209* 0.377*  0.448** 0.295* 0.368* 
 (0.209) (0.118) (0.200)  (0.221) (0.166) (0.220) 
DefunctYear 0.004* 0.002 0.005*  0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -3.806 -4.999 -6.173  -13.408 -11.721 -15.360 
 (11.192) (6.853) (11.446)  (11.189) (8.329) (11.412) 
        
Observations 422 437 437  457 473 473 
R-squared 0.277 0.434 0.377  0.337 0.565 0.463 
Notes: The dependent variables are in log form so as to make them closer to being normally distributed.  Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm-years where there were director qualifications but where 
less than 80% of directors held shares have been removed from columns (1) and (4). 
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Appendix Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Description Data sources 
CourtWoundup A binary variable which equals 1 if the final status of 
company was that it was wound up by a court, 0 otherwise 
RDC, L&EG 
DefunctYear The year the company eventually became defunct 
 
RDC, L&EG 
DirectorQualScale Shareholding requirement for directors scaled by total paid-
up capital 
AoA, SEOI, BOI 
EstablishmentDate 
 
Year in which company was established AoA, SEOI, BOI 
HeadLondon A binary variable which equals 1 if company has a head 
office in London, 0 otherwise 
AoA, SEOI, BOI 
IndustryBreweries A binary variable which equals 1 if company is a brewery, 
0 otherwise 
AoA, SEOI, BOI 
IndustryFinancial A binary variable which equals 1 if company is in financial 
sector, 0 otherwise 
AoA, SEOI, BOI 
IndustryMines A binary variable which equals 1 if company is in mining 
industry, 0 otherwise 
AoA, SEOI, BOI 
IndustryUtility A binary variable which equals 1 if company is a utility, 0 
otherwise 
AoA, SEOI, BOI 
LocalMiles The distance (in miles) between a company’s head office 
and the main market where its shares are traded 
AoA, IMM, SEOI, BOI, 
Google maps 
Merged A binary variable which equals 1 if the final status of 
company was that it merged, 0 otherwise 
RDC 
NonVotePreference A binary variable which equals 1 if company has non-
voting preference shares, 0 otherwise 
AoA, SEOI, BOI 
NumDirectors 
 
The number of directors on the board AoA, SEOI, BOI, SEY 
NumMarkets The number of stock markets where a company’s shares are 
traded 
IMM, SEOI, BOI 
OfficialListing A binary variable which equals 1 if company is listed on 
the Official List, 0 otherwise 
SEOI, BOI 
OwnershipDate 
 
Year in which ownership census was taken Form E ownership returns 
Scottish A binary variable which equals 1 if company is Scottish, 0 
otherwise 
Form E ownership returns 
Size Natural log of company par (paid-up) value  Form E ownership 
returns, SEOI, BOI 
Uncalled Difference between nominal capital and paid-up capital i.e., 
the amount of capital that a shareholder is liable for 
IMM, SEOI, BOI 
VotingNonLinear A binary variable which equals 1 if company has non-linear 
voting scheme, 0 otherwise 
AoA, SEOI, BOI 
   
Notes: AoA = Articles of Association; BOI = Burdett’s Official Intelligence; IMM = Investor’s Monthly 
Manual; L&EG = London and Edinburgh Gazettes; RDC = Register of Defunct Companies; SEOI = Stock 
Exchange Official Intelligence; SEY = Stock Exchange Yearbook. 
 
